Rats received either a common-cause (i.e., A3 B, A3food) or a causal-chain training scenario (i.e., B3 A, A3food) before their tendency to approach the food magazine during the presentation of B was assessed as a function of whether it was preceded by a potential alternative cause. Causal model theory predicts that the influence of an alternative cause should be restricted to the common-cause scenario. In Experiment 1, responding to B was reduced when it occurred after pressing a novel lever during the test phase. This effect was not influenced by the type of training scenario. In Experiment 2, rats were familiarized with the lever prior to test by training it as a potential cause of B. After this treatment, the lever now failed to influence test responding to B. In Experiment 3, rats given common-cause training responded more to B when it followed a cue that had previously been trained as a predictor of B, than when it followed another stimulus. This effect was not apparent in rats that received causal-chain training. This pattern of results is the opposite of that predicted by causal model theory. Thus, in three experiments, the presence of an alternative cause failed to influence test responding in manner consistent with causal model theory. These results undermine the application of causal model theory to rats, but are consistent with associative analyses.
It has been claimed that rats engage in a form of causal reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006) . The evidence that provides support for this claim derives from an experimental scenario that is analogous to our everyday experience: When we know that a single cause (e.g., raindrops) can have two separate effects (wet windows and damp clothing on a washing line), the observation of one effect (wet windows) can lead to the inference that the other effect (damp clothes) has also occurred (Clayton & Dickinson, 2006) . This form of inference must reflect the assumption that the observed effect (wet windows) is the result of its frequently observed cause (rain), which should also produce the second effect (damp clothes); and should then set in train an appropriate course of action (retrieving the washing). However, if one knows that there is alternative cause for the first effect (e.g., a sprinkler is operating near the windows, but not the washing) then it should no longer be inferred that the washing is also getting wet. Under these conditions, the response (retrieving the clothes) is not required. Modulation of the behavior that is provoked by a stimulus (wet windows), as a function of the origin of that stimulus, is predicted by causal model theory (for a review see Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006) and was observed in rats by Blaisdell et al. (2006) .
The training scenario that Blaisdell et al. (2006) gave their rats is analogous to the everyday situation described above. In their study, rats first received training in which one stimulus A (e.g., a light-analogous to raindrops) served as the "common-cause" for two separate effects: B (e.g., a clicker-wet windows), and the delivery of sucrose into a food well (damp clothes). This commoncause treatment was arranged by giving rats separate A3 B and A3sucrose trials. During the subsequent test, B was presented and the tendency of rats to approach the food well was examined as a function of whether the presentation of B was contingent upon rats pressing a lever (intervene condition) or simply occurred without apparent cause (observe condition). Other rats were trained according to a "causal-chain" scenario, where the order of A and B were reversed (i.e., B3 A and A3sucrose trials). In this condition, rats might be expected to respond to B irrespective of whether it occurred as a function of their own behavior, because the chain of associations linking B to sucrose would be unaffected by the manner in which B appeared. Blaisdell et al. (2006) observed that when the rats had received common-cause training, they were less likely to approach the food well during B in the intervene condition than the observe condition. In contrast, this was not the case when they had received causal-chain training. The interaction observed by Blaisdell et al. (2006) is consistent with causal model theory. However, before it can be conclusively taken as evidence for the proposal that rats engage in causal reasoning, a consideration of Lloyd Morgan's Cannon (Morgan, 1894) suggests that simpler mechanisms should be ruled out. We have previously argued that they have not (Dwyer & Burgess, 1 It should be noted that if the rats accurately represented the relative times at which events occurred, those in the causal-chain condition might expect sucrose between 10 and 20 s after the offset of B (rather than during B). Blaisdell et al. (2006) report no effect of the intervene versus the observe manipulation in the causal-chain condition either during B or in the period 10 -20 s after its presentation. 2011; Dwyer, Starns, & Honey, 2009 ). This argument was based on the fact that the alternative cause of stimulus B was pressing a lever that was physically separated from the food magazine, and so any tendency to interact with the lever might interfere with the tendency to visit the food magazine. That is, competition between responses could have contributed to the lower levels of magazine responding when B occurred as a consequence of a rat's own actions. Dwyer et al. (2009) failed to replicate the theoretically vital interaction from the original study, whereby the presentation of B as a consequence of the rats' own actions only interfered with magazine responding in the common-cause condition (but see, Leising, Wong, Waldmann, & Blaisdell, 2008) . However, there was clear evidence of response competition, in that there was a reciprocal relationship, across experimental groups, between magazine responding and lever pressing.
Response competition suggests a potential alternative explanation for the results reported by Blaisdell et al. (2006) and Leising et al. (2008) . However, the existence of this alternative explanation does not, in itself, directly invalidate the claim that rats might be capable of causal reasoning. To return to the human example discussed above, the fact that someone could not both turn on a sprinkler at the front of their house and remove the washing at the back at the same time does not mean that they are unaware that there is no need to bring in the washing (because it is the sprinkler that is wetting the windows and not rain). Although invoking the principle of parsimony, instantiated in Lloyd Morgan's canon, might support the simpler account of the rats' behavior, this is a general principle of interpretation rather than an empirical demonstration that the simpler account is correct. It is possible that difference between our failed replication and the original results was attributable to the response competition that we observed obscuring any behavior that was consistent with causal reasoning. Therefore, the primary aim of the current series of experiments is to examine whether we might observe behavioral evidence for causal reasoning under conditions in which the influence of response competition is reduced. As will be explained in detail below, both environmental stimuli and familiar levers should be less likely to provoke competing behavior than novel levers. In Experiments 1 and 3 we examined the effects of using an environmental stimulus as alternative cause. In Experiments 1 and 2 we manipulated the manner in which the alternative-cause lever was presented during test and/or the opportunity to interact with the lever before test.
Experiment 1
The analysis presented by Blaisdell et al. (2006) , and by causal model theory more generally, suggests that the pattern of results that they observed should not be restricted to cases where the alternative cause is a response that is made by the rats. Returning to the example considered earlier, whether a person turns the sprinkler on themselves or merely observes its operation, the knowledge that there is a cause for wet windows other than rain should be sufficient to determine their behavior. Leising et al. (2008) found that presenting a novel external alternative cue (Ca tone) before the target stimulus (B) during test failed to modulate performance to B. On the basis of these results, they argued that novel interventions (i.e., lever pressing) might have a special significance in understanding causal relations, and might quickly become established as alternative causes and modulate performance accordingly while external cues would not automatically have such special significance. They did, however, allow the possibility that external stimuli might well modulate responding if rats received training with them as an alternative cause of the target stimulus. Following on from previous analyses of causal reasoning (Waldmann, Cheng, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2008; Woodward, 2003) , they stated that "Arbitrary nonaction events can be established as independent, deterministic causes if the strong contingency and the independence of the cause with the effect becomes apparent, such as through learning" (Leising et al., 2008, p. 516 ). This idea, that an external stimulus that is established as a cause of some target event through learning might play the role of an alternative cause in a reasoning model, is interesting for two reasons: first, it represents an untested prediction regarding the ability of rats to engage in causal reasoning; and second, in comparison with pressing a lever, an external stimulus does not require an animal to be in a particular place and it should produce comparatively little response competition.
In Experiment 1, we assessed whether an environmental stimulus that had been trained as an alternative observed cause (cf. Leising et al., 2008) would affect performance to the test stimulus (i.e., B) in the way predicted by causal model theory. The design of Experiment 1 is depicted in Figure 1 and incorporates the critical conditions used by Blaisdell et al. (2006) . Thus rats received either common-cause training (i.e., A3 B, A3food; e.g., tone3clicker, tone3food) or causal-chain training (i.e., B3 A, A3food; e.g., clicker3tone, tone3food), and both forms of training were supplemented by additional training trials intended to create an alternative observed cause (i.e., C3 B; e.g., light3clicker). All rats then received three types of test trials: LP3 B, C3 B, and B alone. The LP3 B trials test the prediction that when the actions of an animal provide an alternative cause for the presentation of B, then this will reduce the tendency of B to elicit magazine activity in the common-cause condition, but not in the causal-chain condition. Unlike in previous experiments of this type, each time the lever was pressed, it was withdrawn from the chamber as B was presented. This arrangement means that the Figure 1 . Schematics for the experimental designs. A and B were auditory stimuli (tone and buzzer), C and D were visual stimuli (left and right light), F is a food pellet, LP is a lever press, LPN is a press on a novel lever, LPT is a press on a lever that has been paired with B, and Ø refers to the absence of a programmed event.
lever would not be present at the same time as the tendency for the rats to approach the food magazine was being assessed, something we hoped might reduce the potential for responding on the lever to interfere with magazine-directed behavior. The C3 B trials test whether an environmental stimulus, previously trained as a signal for B, would act as an alternative cause in the manner predicted by causal model theory. If so, then there should be less magazine approach during B when it followed C in rats given common-cause training than in those given causal-chain training. The B alone trials assess the baseline levels of responding elicited by B.
Method

Subjects.
All experimental procedures were conducted in accordance with the U.K. Animals Scientific Procedures Act, 1986. Thirty-two experimentally naïve male hooded Lister rats (Rattus norvegicus) were maintained at 85% to 90% of their free feeding weights (range: 304 -339 g, mean: 320 g), by restricting the amount of food that they received in their home cages. The rats (obtained from Harlan, Bicester, U.K.) were housed in pairs in a room that was illuminated between 0700 and 2000 h, where they had unrestricted access to water.
Apparatus. Eight standard operant chambers (Med Associates Inc., St Albans, VT) were used (L ϫ W ϫ H ϭ 30 ϫ 25 ϫ 20 cm). Each chamber consisted of two aluminum walls and two clear Perspex walls, with a clear Perspex ceiling and a floor constructed from 0.5 cm diameter stainless steel rods, spaced at 1.5-cm intervals from center-to-center. Each enclosure contained a ventilation fan, and this provided a constant background noise. The chamber was dimly lit by a 28-V, 100-mA shielded house light mounted 2 cm from the ceiling on one aluminum wall. Adjacent to the house light was a speaker (mounted outside of the chamber) that could deliver a 3000-Hz tone and a train of clicks (both at and intensity of 80 dB). These auditory stimuli served as stimuli A and B. Dwyer et al. (2009) used these stimuli in their Experiment 2 and stimuli from different dimensions in their Experiment 1 (cf. Blaisdell et al., 2006) . Although the patterns of results were quite different in the two articles cited immediately above, in neither case did the nature of the stimuli interact with the results that were observed. At the center of the opposite wall (also aluminum) a food well was positioned close to the floor of the chamber, into which a motor-operated dispenser could deliver grain-based food pellets (TestDiet, MLab Rodent Tablet, 45 mg). An infrared photodetector, positioned across the entrance to the food well, was interrogated every 0.01 s. Each time this interrogation revealed that the photo-detector had been interrupted (upon entry of the rat to the food well) a nosepoke was recorded, and the next occasion on which a nosepoke could be recorded was once the detector had returned to its uninterrupted state and was interrupted again. A retractable lever, located 4 cm to the right of the food well and 6 cm above the floor of the chamber, was used; a localized light mounted on the wall directly above the right lever served as the alternative cause (C). The chambers were controlled, and the data recorded, by a PC running MED-PC software (Med Associates Inc.).
Procedure. On the first day of training, food pellets were delivered to the food well on a VT-60 s schedule (range: 30 -90 s). On the next four days, rats received training designed to establish parts of the causal models depicted in Figure 1 . On each of Days 2 and 3, rats received pairings of stimulus A (clicker or tone; counterbalanced within group) with stimulus B (tone or clicker; as determined by the identity of A). In the common-cause group, stimulus A immediately preceded B (i.e., A3 B), whereas in the causal-chain group, stimulus B immediately preceded A (i.e., B3 A). Trials on which stimulus C (i.e., the right light) was paired with stimulus B (i.e., C3 B) were intermixed with the A3 B trials (for the common-cause group) or B3 A trials (for the causal-chain group). Each session consisted of four C3 B trials and eight A3 B trials or B3 A trials. On each of Days 4 and 5, rats received eight trials on which A was immediately followed by the delivery of a food pellet (i.e., A3food). The stimuli (A, B and C) were each 10 s, and the mean intertrial interval (ITI) (offset to onset) was 190 s (range: 100 -280 s).
On Day 6, rats received a single session in which there were three types of test trial: LP3 B, C3 B, and B alone. There were four presentations of each trial type, which occurred in a random order (with the constraint that there was one trial of each type in every block of three trials), and according to the same schedule as during training (i.e., M ϭ 190s; range: 100 -280 s). In this case, the interval was between the offset of B and the onset of the next trial. The results were pooled across test trials on this single test day for the purpose of statistical analysis to reduce trial-by-trial variability in responding (cf. Kutlu & Schmajuk, 2012) . On LP3 B trials, once the designated interval had elapsed, the lever was inserted into the chamber and remained extended until pressed. At this point, B was presented and the lever was withdrawn, to prevent further lever presses occurring during B and reduce the competition with magazine responding (cf. Dwyer et al., 2009 ). C3 B trials were the same as during training. B alone trials consisted of the presentation of B in the absence of any other programmed events. The duration of B on all trial types was 10 s. The primary behavioral measure was the mean numbers of nosepokes per trial in the presence of A (during training) and B (during testing). The pattern of results observed using this measure did not differ appreciably from those seen when the duration of nosepokes was used as the measure of performance. The mean number of nosepokes per trial during the 10-s periods without any programmed stimuli that preceded each trial during training and testing was also recorded.
Results
The mean numbers of nosepoke responses per trial during the two A3food sessions are shown in Table 1 . Inspection of this table reveals that responding was similar in the common-cause and causal-chain groups, and that in both groups the mean levels of responding during the 10-s periods that immediately preceded A were lower than during A. ANOVA confirmed that there was no effect of group, F Ͻ 1, there was an effect of period (i.e., before A vs. during A; F(1, 30) ϭ 43.23, MSE ϭ 39.37, p Ͻ .001), and there was no interaction between these factors, F Ͻ 1. Table 1 also shows the overall levels of nosepoking during the 10s periods that preceded the test trials. Statistical analysis confirms, what inspection of this table suggests, that these rates were similar in the two groups, t Ͻ 1.
The critical results from Experiment 1, the levels of nokepoking during B, minus pretrial responding, are shown in Figure 2 . First consider the influence of the lever press on responding during stimulus B. Examination of Figure 2 suggests that, irrespective of whether the rats had received common-cause or causal-chain training, the level of responding during B was greater when it was presented alone than when it immediately followed a lever press. Now consider the consequences of providing an alternative trained cause (C) for stimulus B. Examination of Figure 2 reveals a tendency for the level of responding during B to be greater when it was presented alone than when it immediately followed C. However, this tendency was, if anything, more evident in the causal-chain group than the common-cause group. This pattern of results is inconsistent with the predictions of causal model theory.
The results were subjected to ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of training group (common-cause vs. causal-chain) and a within-subjects factor of test trial type (LP3 B, C3 B, and B alone). This confirmed that there was no main effect of training group, F Ͻ 1, but that there was an effect of trial type, F(2, 60) ϭ 5. 
Discussion
The effects of presenting an external stimulus as a trained alternative cause of B are difficult to assess conclusively because responding on the C3 B trials lay between the levels of responding on LP3 B and B alone trials without being significantly different from either of them. That said, there was no suggestion that any trend toward lower responding on C3 B trials was stronger in the common-cause group as would be predicted by causal model theory. Indeed, any tendency for the light to interfere with magazine activity to stimulus B could also reflect response competition. For example, it seems entirely plausible to suppose that the light elicits an orienting response, and some vestige of this response interferes with magazine activity during the presentation of B (cf. Dwyer et al., 2009 ). We will return to this issue, and provide a better control against which to contrast the effects of such an alternative cause, in Experiment 3.
The fact that the lever press intervention manipulation had an equivalent effect on magazine responding during B in the two training conditions is inconsistent with the predictions of causal model theory and with the results reported by Blaisdell et al. (2006) . However, these results are consistent with those reported by Dwyer et al. (2009) . Although the lever was not physically present during the critical stimuli, it is certainly possible that both its initial presentation and subsequent removal would elicit a strong orienting response. In addition, as we have noted before (see Dwyer et al., 2009 ), a single lever press is merely the discrete end point of approach to, and contact with, the lever and so the ability of a lever press to interfere with other responses would extend beyond the time of the lever press itself. Thus, withdrawing the lever did not appear to eliminate response competition. We will consider other manipulations of the lever, also intended to reduce response competition, in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, withdrawing the lever from the chamber as B was presented appeared to be insufficient, on its own, to eliminate response competition. One possible reason for this it that both the lever, and its removal upon being pressed, are novel and thus might elicit a large amount of orienting and other unconditioned behaviors. An obvious way to reduce such unconditioned behaviors is to simply familiarize the rats with the lever prior before test. However, presenting the lever without consequence could also reduce its tendency to be considered an alternative cause. Therefore, in Experiment 2, stimulus B was presented after each lever press. This should help to establish lever pressing as an independent alternative cause of B, while reducing its tendency to provoke competing behaviors based on its novelty.
2 There were never any significant effects in the post-CS period (cf. Blaisdell et al., 2006) ; indeed, responding in this period was typically no higher than in the absence of any programmed stimuli. Thus these data will not be considered further here. Figure 1 shows the full design adopted in Experiment 2. During the first stage of training, rats either received common-cause training (i.e., A3 B, A3food) or causal-chain training (i.e., B3 A, A3food). Both forms of training were supplemented by additional trials in which a lever was inserted into the box. When the lever was pressed, it was retracted, and stimulus B was presented for 10 s. At test, responding to B after either a press on the trained lever (LPT), or on a novel lever (LPN), was compared with responding on trials where B appeared alone. According to the causal analysis LPT should only influence responding in the common cause condition, and this influence should be at least as marked as for the untrained lever, LPN, which had not been trained as an independent cause. However, according to an analysis based upon competing responses alone, LPT should not interfere with responding to B, whereas LPN will do so to the extent that it is treated as entirely different to LPT.
Method
Subjects and apparatus. Experiment 2 was conducted with two replications, each consisting of 32 experimentally naïve male hooded Lister rats that were sourced and maintained in the same way as previously described. The mean free-feeding weight was 246 g (range: 222-320 g) for the first replication, whereas for the second replication the mean was 340 g (range: 274 -397 g). Rats were trained in the same operant chambers as previously described.
Procedure. Magazine training was conducted as in Experiment 1. On each of the next 2 days, rats were presented with four presentations of the lever and eight pairings of A and B. The common-cause group were given presentations of A that were immediately followed by B, whereas the causal-chain group were given B immediately followed by A. On lever presentation trials, the lever was inserted into the box and remained extended until it was pressed, whereupon it was withdrawn and stimulus B was presented. The trained lever was counterbalanced within groups, with half of the rats in each group receiving the lever to the left of the magazine and the remainder receiving the lever to the right of it. A and B were counterbalanced in the same manner as previously and were both 10 s long. On each of training Days 4 and 5, rats received eight trials where stimulus A was followed by the delivery of a food pellet. The mean ITI during training (offset to onset of trials) was 190 s and ranged from 100 -280 s. On Day 6, rats received one test session with the trial types shown in Figure 1 (LPT3 B, LPN3 B, and B alone). Trials were presented randomly (with the constraint that one trial of each type occurred in every three-trial block), four times each, at an ITI matched to that of the training. On lever trials, the lever was inserted into the box, and a lever press resulted in its retraction and the presentation of B. B alone trials consisted of the presentation of B in the absence of a lever or other programmed external stimulus.
Results and Discussion
The data from the two replications were combined for presentational purposes, but it should be noted that the critical statistical effects were the same in both replications when analyzed separately. Training sessions two and three required rats to press a lever without receiving a reinforcer for doing so. Under these conditions, it was unsurprising that some rats failed to complete these sessions and thus were removed from the analysis. This left 28 rats in the causal-chain group and 25 in the common-cause. Table 1 shows responding during the critical stimuli in the final stage of training (A3 F). Both groups nosepoked more frequently during A than in the pre-CS (conditioned stimulus) period. ANOVA confirmed that there was an effect of time period, F(1, 51) ϭ 48.17, MSE ϭ 38.18, p Ͻ .001, no effect of group (F Ͻ 1), but the interaction between these factors was on the borderline of conventional significance, F(1, 51) ϭ 4.04, MSE ϭ 38.18, p ϭ .05, suggesting a higher rate of responding to A in the causal chain group. Table 1 also presents mean pretrial responding in the test phase, where again there was no difference between the groups, t Ͻ 1. Figure 3 presents the frequency of nosepoke responding during the critical stimuli at test, minus the pretrial responses. Inspection of this figure suggests that rats in the common-cause group responded at higher rates than those in the causal-chain group, but that in neither training group was there a tendency for responses to be lower on trials where B occurred after a lever press than on trials where B was presented alone. ANOVA revealed a significant effect of training group, F(1, 51) ϭ 5.60, MSE ϭ 6.44, p ϭ .022, no effect of test trial type, and no interaction between these factors, Fs Ͻ 1. The effect of group is not the same as that observed during training, and the basis for the difference is not immediately clear. An analysis including replication as a factor revealed no effect of this factor and no interactions involving it (Fs Ͻ 1).
The 95% confidence intervals for the B minus pretrial response scores did not include zero in any of the conditions in either group. That is, in all test conditions rats were approaching the magazine during B at a higher level than they were during the pretrial period. Therefore, the absence of any effects of trial type does not reflect a general failure to respond. In addition, in contrast to both Experiment 1 and Dwyer et al. (2009) , responding to B was not significantly reduced when it followed a lever press (either when the lever was novel or trained). Thus, exposure to a lever before test appears only to have attenuated response competition in a nonspecific way, which presumably reflects a process of generalization between the two levers or the responses that they prompt. Most importantly, even though rats had received training whereby a lever press resulted in the presentation of stimulus B, which should enhance its tendency to be treated as an alternative cause of B, lever pressing failed to modulate responding to B as predicted by the causal account.
Experiment 3
As noted in the discussion of Experiment 1, the design of that experiment meant that the effect of an alternative trained cause was compared to a condition where no external stimulus was presented before responding to the critical test stimulus was assessed. A more adequate assessment of the effect of an alternative trained cause (C), and one that controls for the general consequences of stimulus presentation (e.g., orienting responses), should involve a comparison with an equivalent stimulus that has not been trained as an alternative cause (D). Under such circumstances, one might be more sensitive to any genuine effect that pairing C with B has on subsequent responding to B. The experimental design adopted in Experiment 3 is depicted in Figure 1 . During the first stage of training, rats either received common-cause training (i.e., A3 B, A3food) or causal-chain training (i.e., B3 A, A3food). Both forms of training were supplemented by additional training trials intended to create an alternative observed cause (i.e., C3 B) and a control stimulus (D alone) that was not an alternative cause. All rats then received two types of test trials: C3 B and D3 B. The questions of interest were whether C and D would have different effect on responding to B during the test and whether any such effect interacts with the nature of training (common-cause or causal-chain).
Method
Subjects and apparatus. Experiment 3 was conducted as two replications each using 32 experimentally naïve male hooded Lister rats. The rats were obtained from the same source and maintained in the same way as those described in Experiment 1. The mean free feeding weight of the first replication was 321 g, with a range of 305-344 g, and in the second replication, a mean of 316 g and a range of 290 -336 g. Rats were trained in the same operant chambers as Experiment 1, with the exception that the light above the left lever, that was in other respects equivalent to that above the right lever, was also used.
Procedure. On the first day of training, rats were trained to collect food pellets from the food well in the same way as Experiment 1. On Days 2 and 3, they received three types of trial in a pseudorandom sequence. Group common-cause received the following trials types: A3 B (8 trials per session), C3 B (4 trials per session), and D alone (4 trials per session); group causal-chain received the same set and number of trials with the exception that the eight A3 B trials were replaced with 8 B3 A trials. For both groups, the identity of the auditory stimulus (tone or clicker) that served as A or B was counterbalanced, and the identity of the visual stimulus (left or right light) that served as C or D was also counterbalanced in the subgroups created by the previous counterbalancing operation. On Days 4 and 5, rats received 8 presentations of A that were followed immediately by the delivery of food. On Day 6, rats received four presentations of two types of trial: C3 B and D3 B. These trials were presented in a pseudorandom sequence. The mean ITI during training and testing was 190 s (range: 100 -280 s).
Results and Discussion
The data from both replications were analyzed together for presentational purposes. Table 1 shows the training data during the A3food days. It is apparent that responding during A is higher than during the 10-s period before A for both groups. This was supported by an ANOVA, showing a main effect of time period, F(1, 62) ϭ 45.16, MSE ϭ 37.81, p Ͻ .001, but no effect of group, and no interaction between these factors, Fs Ͻ 1. Table 1 also shows the overall levels of nosepoking during the 10-s periods that preceded CS presentation on test, which did not differ between groups, t(62) ϭ 1.11, p ϭ .271. Figure 4 displays the mean nosepoking frequencies (less pre-CS responding) during stimulus B on trials on which it was preceded by the alternative cause (C) and the control stimulus (D) as a factor of training group (common-cause vs. causal-chain). In contrast to the predictions of causal model theory, responding to B was higher after the alternative cause (C) than the unpaired control stimulus (D) in the common-cause group, with this trend reversed in the causal-chain group. ANOVA confirmed that there were no main effects of the type of stimulus preceding B or training group, Fs Ͻ 1. There was an interaction between these two factors, F(1, 62) ϭ 6.06, MSE ϭ 7.45, p ϭ .017. Responding to B, as a function of the preceding stimulus type (C or D), differed significantly in the common-cause group, F(1, 31) ϭ 4.65, MSE ϭ 8.06, p ϭ .039 but not in the causal-chain group, F(1, 31) ϭ 1.67, MSE ϭ 6.84, p ϭ .207. A combined analysis of the two experiments that included replication as a factor revealed no effect of this factor or interactions involving it (Fs Ͻ 1).
The results observed here were unexpected on the basis of causal model theory; indeed, they were the exact reverse of prediction derived from it. We consider possible explanations for these intriguing results in the General Discussion. For now it is sufficient to note that they provide no support for the idea that rats create causal models from the training that they received in Experiment 3, and this cannot be attributable to a failure of the rats to learn about C and D during training because these stimuli did modulate responding to B. Blaisdell et al. (2006) reported that when rats are given training where one cue (A) separately predicts two outcomes (i.e., A3 B and A3food; common-cause training) they approached the magazine when B was presented during a subsequent test. Moreover, responding to B was modulated by the manner in which it was presented: it was lower when B occurred after a lever press performed by the rat than when B occurred alone. This modulation of responding to B was not seen in various control conditions (e.g., when initial training established a chain of associations: B3 A and A3food). These results were interpreted as providing support for the idea that the rats might have encoded a simple causal model of the training situation, wherein A was the common-cause of two separate events (B and food). Possession of this model would normally license the inference that B had been generated by its usual cause (A) and that A would thus have also caused food to be delivered. This inference would not hold if there was an alternative cause for B (in this case the lever press). The modulation of responding to B, as a function of whether it was produced by a rat's own actions or not, was taken as evidence that magazine behavior was under the control of causal inference mechanisms (and in particular, the mechanisms described by causal model theory).
General Discussion
Although this pattern of results has been replicated by the laboratory in which it was first reported (Leising et al., 2008) , direct replications of their procedures in our laboratory have failed to reveal the original pattern of results (Dwyer et al., 2009 ). Instead, Dwyer et al. (2009) consistently found that irrespective of the training that rats received (common-cause, causal chain or direct conditioning) responding to B was lower when it followed a lever press. Moreover, Dwyer et al. (2009) also observed (across experimental conditions) a reciprocal relationship between nosepoking to B and lever pressing-a relationship that suggests interference between these two forms of response. Thus, these previous results suggest that it is not necessary to invoke causal reasoning mechanisms to explain the rats' behavior-a simpler account in terms of the competition between responses is also possible (see Morgan, 1894) . Unfortunately, neither Blaisdell et al. (2006) nor Leising et al. (2008) reported the levels of lever pressing during the critical stimulus B in all experimental conditions, thereby preventing an assessment of the potential role of response competition in their data. Thus, while considerations of parsimony support adopting the simpler explanation of the overall pattern of results, it remained possible that the response competition in our previous experiments had simply obscured any behavior that was under the control of causal reasoning mechanisms. Therefore, the current series of experiments was performed to examine whether we could find evidence consistent with causal reasoning in rats in situations that might be expected to reduce response competition.
Experiment 1 examined the effect of presenting an external stimulus that had been trained as an independent predictor or cause of the critical test stimulus, B, and by removing the lever from the chamber once it had been pressed. The response to B was lower when it followed the lever press than when it was presented alone, but again this effect was observed irrespective of the training that the rats had received (common-cause or causal-chain). Responding to B was not significantly affected by the presentation of a trained external cause, C, although there was at least some suggestion of a decrement in responding. Experiment 2 demonstrated that training the rats with the lever as an independent cause of B, before test, abolished the influence of lever pressing on nosepoking during B. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that responding to B was only affected by lever pressing when the rats experienced levers for the first time in the test session. Experiment 3 examined nosepoking to B as a function of whether it followed an external cue, C, that had previously predicted B, or a control external stimulus, D, that had not. Responding to B was modulated by whether it followed C or D, and this interacted with training condition. However, the form of this interaction was the opposite to that predicted by causal model theory: in rats given commoncause training responding to B was higher when it followed a trained alternative cause, C, than the control stimulus, D, and this effect was not seen in the causal-chain control condition.
Before speculating about the origin of the novel effects seen in Experiment 3, it is appropriate to consider the status of the hypothesis that rats might have the capacity to engage in causal reasoning. The critical evidence concerns the situation in which an alternative cause for a particular event modulates the response to that event depending upon how it is represented in a causal model. There have now been three published experiments in which modulation of responding to B, as a function of whether it followed a lever press or not, was greater in rats given common-cause training than in some relevant control condition : Experiments 1 and 2A; Leising et al., 2008: Experiment 3) . There have been four experiments in which this critical interaction has not been observed: two were direct replications (Dwyer et al., 2009 : Experiments 1 and 2), and a further two were performed using analogous designs that matched stimulus and training parameters to the previous experiments (the current Experiments 1 and 2). In a further experiment, designed to assess the impact of a trained external cause for B, the results were the opposite of those predicted by causal model theory (Experiment 3). It is certainly true that there are some differences between the different sets of experiments summarized immediately above: for example, some used female rats tested in the dark portion of the cycle, whereas others used male rats tested in the light portion of the cycle, and the strain of animals differed (Long-Evans vs. hooded Lister; for a further discussion see, Dwyer et al., 2009; Kutlu & Schmajuk, 2012) . Differences of this type might have influenced the results of the experiments. However, if rats possess the ability to control their behavior according to the output of a causal reasoning process, then this should be generally apparent, rather than being restricted to a single strain and sex of rats housed under particular conditions. The fact that the majority of published studies fail to find the critical interaction, predicted by causal model theory, suggests that the observation of this interaction might be attributable to things unrelated to causal reasoning. Previously, we have relied on principles of parsimony to argue that it is not necessary to invoke causal reasoning mechanisms in rats to explain the existing data (Dwyer & Burgess, 2011; Dwyer et al., 2009 ). While we maintain that view, we should emphasize that the balance of evidence does not make a compelling prima facie case for the existence of causal reasoning mechanisms in the rat.
If we are not to rely on principles of causal reasoning to guide our analysis of the current data, then it is now appropriate to speculate about other explanations of the effects observed. Our speculation will be guided by associative analyses. The first step is to consider why, according to associative theorizing, rats might respond during B at all. In the causal-chain condition, the most obvious basis for responding to B is that the presentation of B will activate the associative chain B3 A3food. It should be clear that for rats given common-cause training, the basis for responding during B is unlikely to be this associative chain: although A will be able to activate food, B should not be so able to activate A, because the nature of their pairing (A3 B) means that any excitatory link from B to A is likely to be relatively ineffective (see Wagner, 1981) . So, why do rats given this form of training visit the food well during B? One obvious possibility is based upon mediated conditioning (Dwyer, 2003; Holland, 1983 Holland, , 1990 ). When A is paired with B, an association will form that will allow the associatively provoked memory of B to be active on trials where A is later paired with food. This could allow an association for form between the retrieved representation of B and food, thus providing a basis for rats to visit the food well during B.
Given that there are associatively based accounts to explain why rats given either common-cause or causal-chain training visit the food well when B is presented, the question then becomes the following: Why is responding to B affected by what takes place immediately before it? We have already considered the possibility of response competition, whereby the tendency to interact with whatever preceded B (in particular a novel lever) would be inconsistent with producing a magazine response. Other things being equal, this mechanism should have equivalent effects regardless of the mechanism supporting the response to B, which is exactly what we observed when the lever was novel in Experiment 1 and previously (Dwyer et al., 2009 ). In rats that had previously experienced lever presses paired with B, lever pressing did not affect responding to B at test (Experiment 2). But, what of the situation in Experiment 3, where the presentation of C (that had previously signaled B) and D (which had not) had different effects on responding to B depending on whether the rats had received common-cause or casual chain training?
Take first the common-cause condition. What is required is an account for why B elicits greater responding on trials on which it was preceded by C than when it was preceded by D. One possibility is based on the observation that as a result of C3 B trials, during training, the subsequent presentation of C, at test, will activate the memory of B into the same, associatively activated state, as it occupies when it is paired with food on A3food trials. This will not be the case when B is preceded by D. This idea receives direct support from the results of recent studies which used procedures (i.e., second-order conditioning and sensory preconditioning) that are similar to those used in the current experiments. Lin and Honey (2011) demonstrated that the associatively and directly activated representations of a stimulus are distinct and can be associated with different outcomes (see also Lin & Honey, 2010) . This implies that there will not be perfect generalization between the associatively and directly activated representations of a stimulus, and thus any response elicited by one of these will be elicited to only a lesser extent by the other.
3 Obviously, this associatively based account was developed after the current data were collected and so requires further testing before it can be uncritically accepted. That said, it provides an explanation of why animals approach the food magazine during the presentation of B at all, and also of why this response to B will be modulated by the context in which B appears in some circumstances but not others.
Although there was no significant difference in responding to B as a function of whether it followed C or D in group causal-chain, it is worth briefly considering why the analysis described in the preceding paragraph would not also apply here. In the causal-chain condition, training should have resulted in the formation of a B3 A association and an A3food association, and responding to B at test will involve activation of the associative chain B3 A3food as opposed to the form of mediated learning described in the previous paragraph. That is, activation of B by C during test will not mean that it is in the same representational state as during training. Moreover, during the test, presenting C but not D should associatively activate the memory of B before its occurrence. There is a long history of research that has examined the effect of such associative primes (here C) on performance to a target stimulus (B). Most often, it is assumed that the provision of such a prime will have a detrimental effect on the processing of a target stimulus (see Wagner, 1981) . Application of this analysis predicts that B should elicit less responding when it is presented after C than when it is presented after D, because B will be less capable of provoking activity in the putative associative chain (see Honey, Good, & Manser, 1998; Honey, Hall & Bonardi, 1993) . There was some indication that this was the case in Experiment 3.
In summary, the results of the current experiments provide no support for the view that rats engage in a process of reasoning as instantiated by causal model theory. Instead, they are consistent with an associative analysis, albeit one that both allows simple processes of response competition to operate, and affords richer encoding operations than are often considered. Like Kutlu and Schmajuk (2012) , we feel that the experiments published previously can be accommodated without assuming that rats are capable of causal reasoning, as they are also consistent with the operation of simpler mechanisms. Here, we attempted to reduce the potential role of one such mechanism (i.e., response competition), but in so doing failed to reveal the patterns of results predicted by causal model theory (Experiments 1 and 2) . Indeed, the results of Experiment 3 are the opposite to those predicted by such an analysis.
3 It might well be asked why similar effects are not seen in Experiment 2, where rats received training where a lever press predicted the presentation of the critical stimulus, and thus might be expected to evoke its associatively activated representation. However, in Experiment 3, the stimuli (A and C) that might evoke the associative representation of B were both externally presented visual cues, and so it would be reasonable to expect good generalization between the representations of B that were elicited by both stimuli. This will not be the case in Experiment 2, where the associatively activated representation of B that was paired with food was elicited by an external visual cue (A) while on Test B was preceded by a lever press.
